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WORKER SAFETY IN MAINE’S BOATYARDS

Worker Safety in Maine’s Boatyards:
Improving OSHA Compliance Efforts
by Jeremy A. Pare

strategies for regulating occupational
health and safety at Maine boatyards. The current approach
According to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Maine’s boatemployed by OSHA is widely seen
yards are a high-hazard industry, given the many potential threats their employees face
as ineffective at stimulating safe,
daily. Maine’s boatyards struggle with OSHA regulations because OSHA’s commandhazard-free work environments. An
and-control rules leave little room for flexibility, and as evidenced by the boatyards’
examination of OSHA’s inspection
high workers’ compensation costs and injury rates, implementation does not effecdata for inspections of Maine’s boattively protect boatyard workers. This article investigates whether changes to OSHA’s
yards from 2000 to 2016 and Maine
50-year-old punitive regulatory strategy can influence the way boatyards self-regulate
Department of Labor data for worker
and decrease hazards and minimize the risk of injury to workers. Through focus groups
injuries at Maine boatyards during a
and interviews, the article provides evidence that changes within OSHA’s regulatory
similar period show that many safety
strategy are necessary to decrease the hazards present in Maine boatyards. Suggested
hazards at boatyards are not being
changes include site-specific injury and illness prevention programs and more frequent
adequately addressed by employers.
These hazards include lack of
inspections with opportunities for boatyards to fix issues. These improvements should
machine guarding for employees
increase cooperative efforts between OSHA, the state of Maine, and Maine’s boatyards
(possible severe lacerations or ampuand reduce the number of worker injuries.
tations), lack of electrical protections
(possible severe burns or electrocution), open floor hatches (possible
INTRODUCTION
falls from great heights); and inadequate protections for
hands, face, and respiratory functions (possible longhe primary goal of federal safety policy is to decrease
term health problems). Despite many efforts to address
the number of hazards facing American workers.
these issues at individual boatyards, the hazards continue
The federal government spends millions of dollars every
to be problems for the industry as a whole, partly attribyear to this end, yet Occupational Safety and Health
utable to lack of safety knowledge or the cost associated
Administration (OSHA), which regulates safety for the
with safety efforts. Additionally, few boatyards address
nation, essentially relies on standards that are not appliuncodified safety issues such as ergonomic hazards,
cable to all sites and operates with fewer inspectors than
which may also lead to worker injury.
optimal. Additionally, many businesses have not been
The theory that informs this case study is important
visited by OSHA, do not fully understand how to deal
because the various interests involved in safety regulawith existing standards, and do not have the resources to
tion—economic, legal, or political—can lead to the
fully implement all aspects of the standards. According
implementation of differing regulatory strategies. As
to personal accounts and research from 2010 to 2019,
promulgated by the 1970 Occupational Safety and
a lack of regulatory certainty defines the general state of
Health Act (OSH Act), OSHA’s dominant regulatory
affairs at many of Maine’s boat builders and repair shops
strategy relies on a highly centralized and rule-bound
(hereafter boatyards), so the number of hazards found at
model of social control over America’s businesses and
Maine boatyards remains high year after year.
governmental entities. This strategy has been described
This case study relied on interviews of federal and
by Nonet and Selznick (2001) as autonomous law, but
state regulators, a survey of Maine’s marine trade organiis more widely known as command and control. Under
zation members, and focus groups comprised of Maine
such a strategy, decision makers regulate industries based
boat builders to investigate more-effective and -equitable
Abstract
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Figure 1:
Location of Maine Boatyards
on rules that are fully
vetted and formally
codified under the
administrative procedures of the federal
Maine
government. These
rules are enforced by
agents who inspect
facilities and have
the authority to levy
fines for noncompliance with the rules.
Over the last three
decades, command
and control has
become the way legal
Number of
scholars talk about
Boatyards
1
state-based regula2
tion (Short 2012).
3
Command and
4
control
is
an
5
important regulatory
6
strategy for OSHA as
the agency has
approximately 2,100
Source: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/industry.html
inspectors who are
responsible for the
health and safety of more than 130 million workers in 8
goals and maximize social welfare. Such a strategy is
million workplaces across the country: an average of one
expected to decrease the number of hazards present in
compliance officer for every 59,000 workers.1 The agency
Maine boatyards. Given the policy-making role
uses the command-and-control strategy to deter firms
Congress contemplated for OSHA in its enabling
from disregarding the rules it is charged with enforcing in
statute, the agency is entitled to deference regarding its
high-hazard industries. The approach contrasts sharply
ability to make such a change in strategy. This deferwith the cooperative partnership or federalism approach
ence has been upheld by the courts in a number of
OSHA has used in the past; the authority for such a coopcases over the past few decades and was codified with
erative strategy specifically exists under the OSH Act.
the term “Chevron deference” by the US Supreme
OSHA recognizes that an enhanced focus on
Court (Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 [1984]). In
prevention would reduce workplace hazards (OSHA
these terms, it is possible to understand the broader
2012), and the agency has investigated proactive regutheoretical significance of the regulatory policies
latory programs at the state level, within private
opportunities to be explored in this study.
industry, and at the international level to gain greater
insight into what a more responsive regulatory strategy
WORKER SAFETY AT MAINE BOATYARDS
would mean for American workers. OSHA’s focus on
complex situational deterrence and liability enforceata collected by the Maine Department of Labor
ment over the years has not facilitated broad-based
since 2000 indicate that injuries caused by
compliance with its rules, especially at small- and
workplace hazards are ever present in Maine boatyards
medium-sized enterprises. A new focus on cooperation
(see Figure 1 for location of Maine boatyards). These
may allow firms to more effectively internalize OSHA’s
boatyards have been regulated by OSHA since 1970,
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yet the data indicate that OSHA has not improved
largely ignoring the call for reducing hazards perhaps
worker safety in boatyards to any great extent over
due to individual circumstances.
time. OSHA’s regulations and current punitive regulatory strategy ultimately determine boatyards’ safety
OSHA COMMAND AND CONTROL
decisions, and multiple factors contribute to what level
of effort boatyard owners choose to employ.
n the four decades since the OSH Act
The first of these factors is a direct result of OSHA’s
was signed into law by Congress, workindividualized industry standards. Because of space
place deaths and reported occupational injuries
limitations on the waterfront, boatyards often have
have dropped by more than 60 percent
inland buildings separate from their waterfront operaunder its command-and-control regulatory strategy
tions. Therefore, boatyards are regulated by multiple sets
(OSHA 2012). However, the nation’s workforce
of OSHA regulations: general industry (OSHA Standard
continues to face an unacceptable number of work-re1910) and maritime standards (OSHA Standard 1915).
lated deaths, injuries, and illnesses, most of them
In addition, boatyards are subject to the specific regulapreventable. Over 4,000 people die on the job each year,
tions promulgated under direct industry standards as
and more than four million workers suffer serious jobwell as by standards that are adopted by OSHA indirelated injuries due to unabated hazards (OSHA 2012).
rectly under its general duty clause, which requires
Boatyards have a total injury and illness incidence rate
work sites to identify hazards and eliminate them to
of 5.9 cases per 100 full-time workers (compared to the
provide a universally safe workplace for their
Table 1:
Number of Injuries and Workers’ Compenation
employees. These regulations apply differently
Costs for Maine Boatyards from 2001 to 2016.
to electricians, painters, hazardous waste operators, and administrators, among others, whose
individual jobs call for expertise and imputed
Number
OSHA
knowledge above and beyond employees
Injury rate
recordable
without these special skills. Lastly, because
per 100
injuries
Workers’
OSHA has rarely randomly inspected boatNumber
full time
(approxiCompensation
Year
employed
workers
mate)
costs
yards over the last few decades—due to insufficient resources—boatyards have been lulled
2001
1584
6.4
104
$890,556.37
into a belief that the agency will not visit them.
2002
1557
5.2
81
$494,090.73
If a boatyard chooses to not comply with an
2003
1531
5.3
82
$966,967.06
OSHA standard, or if an aspect of a standard is
2004
1533
9.8
151
$1,476,357.65
not clear to the boatyard and thus not complied
2005
1545
10.6
164
$856,537.98
with, it may be fined by OSHA. This is a
chance many boatyards are willing to take.
2006
1554
8.7
136
$722,611.17
Due to high incident rates in 2001 and
2007
1555
14.5
226
$1,147,437.37
2011, Maine boatyards have been the subject
2008
1532
12.5
192
$1,328,413.17
of OSHA local emphasis programs. This
2009
1100
12.3
136
$362,074.31
designation subjects the boatyards to planned
OSHA inspections and allows boatyards to
2010
1074
8.9
96
$728,746.55
participate in cooperative programs (OSHA
2011
1128
11.3
128
$398,914.82
2000, 2011). Employees in the private boat2012
1195
11.8
142
$577,459.11
building sector face many risks (Table 1), and
2013
1231
8.9
110
$506,780.60
OSHA consistently targets such facilities, so
Maine’s boatyards are under constant pressure
2014
1411
7.3
104
$988,440.33
to protect their employees from hazards. Many
2015
1493
7.2
108
$895,907.29
boatyards are responding to the call for action
2016
1387
6.3
88
$722,736.84
by starting or expanding safety programs and
Source: Maine Department of Labor
building safer facilities. Other boatyards are
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national average for all private-sector industry of 2.8)
and a days-away-from-work, restricted-and-transferredactivity (DART) rate of 3.8 cases per 100 full-time
workers (compared to the national average for all
private-sector industry of 1.6) (OSHA 2000).
Health and safety standards that aim to reduce the
number of injuries at Maine’s boatyards are governed
by institutions at both the state and federal levels. The
US Department of Labor is empowered under the
OSH Act to set ex ante safety standards in the workplace to reduce hazards and to enforce them through
punitive inspections. Workers are formally protected
at the state level by state-administered schemes
allowing them ex post compensation for workplace
injuries that have already occurred. The OSH Act
allows the agency to issue standards governing workplace hazards and to enforce these standards through
workplace inspections.

OSHA’s bureaucratic structure
has raised concerns about its
ability to regulate a large, diverse,
and far-flung constituency.
Inspections may actively deter firms from causing
harm to workers through employer penalties or serve
as an information source for identifying hazards. Gray
and Mendeloff (2005) found a 22 percent decline in
workplace injuries in the few years following an OSHA
inspection in which penalties were imposed, but also
found that this effect decays over time. Such specific
deterrence is important, but the fact that a firm’s attentiveness fades over time raises concerns about the ultimate effectiveness of this approach. Such concern is
shared by OSHA. Its own inspectors have reported
that alterations made following an inspection are often
temporary fixes rather than systemic long-term reforms
(Simon 1997). This fading attentiveness has also been
the case among Maine’s boatyards. An analysis of
Maine Department of Labor statistics (Table 1) indicates that OSHA’s inspection programs in 2001 had an
impact for a year or two following the inspection, but
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this impact faded quickly and did not translate into a
reduction in the incidence of injury and illness below
the national average at any point in over a decade. The
local emphasis program undergone in 2011 has seemingly had a greater impact on the number of recordable
injuries to workers, yet the injury rate is still more than
twice the private-sector industrial average.
OSHA’s bureaucratic structure has raised concerns
about its ability to regulate a large, diverse, and far-flung
constituency. A specific concern is that an agency with
authorities who are remote from the day-to-day
operations will have trouble collecting the information
they need to regulate effectively. This information gap
forces the agency to enact uniform command-and-control standards that apply across the board, irrespective of
individual circumstances. It also creates incentives for
agency staff to apply these standards in a rigid, legalistic
way (Short 2012). A complaint of OSHA’s enforcement
policies is that the agency relies too heavily on punishment to induce compliance and often ignores cooperative enforcement policies (Shapiro and Rabinowitz
1997). Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) argue that the
more sanctions can be kept in the background and the
more regulation can be transacted through moral
suasion, the more effective regulation will be. The
authors state that,
Going in with punishment as a strategy of first
choice is counterproductive in a number of ways.
First, punishment is expensive, persuasion is cheap.
Second, punitive enforcement engenders a game of
regulatory cat-and-mouse whereby firms defy the
spirit of the law by exploiting loopholes, and the
state writes more and more specific rules to cover the
loopholes. (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: 26)

The results, the authors suggest, can lead to, “rule
making by accretion that gives no coherence to the rules
as a package, and a barren legalism concentrating on
specific, simple, visible violations to the neglect of
underlying systemic problems” (Ayers and Braithwaite
1992: 26). In fact, this neglectful state of affairs accurately describes the regulatory strategy of OSHA’s
inspection program over the past decade as can be seen
by OSHA’s online inspection data for boat builders
(NAICS 336612).2
The command-and-control model is not the only
method to achieve safety results. Most large companies
with noteworthy safety and health achievements see
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the use safety management systems, also known as
injury and illness prevention programs, as the key to
success. Convinced of the value, effectiveness, and
feasibility of these collaborative programs, many countries around the world now also require employers to
implement and maintain them, including Canada,
Australia, the 27 European Union member states,
Norway, Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea (OSHA 2012).
Injury and illness prevention programs are not new to
the safety community in the United States either.
OSHA itself has proposed such programs for a number
of years and has defined their elements as, “a proactive
process to help employers find and fix workplace
hazards before workers are hurt” (OSHA 2012: 1). In
fact, OSHA acknowledges that many workplaces have
already adopted such approaches and has even
promoted the adoption of such plans as part of its strategic partnerships with shipbuilders in the state of
Virginia. OSHA states, “not only do these employers
experience dramatic decreases in workplace injuries,
but they often report a transformed workplace culture
that can lead to higher productivity and quality,
reduced turnover, reduced costs, and greater employee
satisfaction” (OSHA 2012: 1). OSHA believes that
injury and illness prevention programs are based on
proven managerial concepts that have already been
widely used in industry to bring about improvements
in quality control and environmental performance
such as total quality management and other lean
manufacturing techniques.
According to OSHA (2012), the key elements
common to successful prevention programs are
•
•
•
•
•
•

management leadership
worker participation
hazard identification and assessment
hazard prevention and control
education and training
program evaluation and improvement with
procedures for investigating incidents and
communicating results

Each element is important in ensuring the success of the
overall program, and all of the elements are interdependent. As every business is different, employers who
implement programs to prevent injury and illness will
have to adapt these elements to meet the needs of their
organizations, as would certainly be the case with
Maine’s boatyards.
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Numerous studies have examined the effectiveness
of injury and illness prevention programs. OSHA says
the research demonstrates that such programs are effective in transforming workplace culture, leading to reductions in injuries, illnesses, and fatalities, and lowering
workers’ compensation and other costs. In a 2008 study,
researchers examined the effectiveness of a Pennsylvania
voluntary program that provides a 5 percent discount
for workers’ compensation premiums to employers that
establish joint labor-management safety committees.
Once created, these committees are then responsible for
implementing several elements of injury and illness
prevention programs, including hazard identification,
workplace inspection, and adaptive management. The
researchers found a strong association between improved
injury and illness experience and the level of compliance
with the program requirements (LaTourrette and
Mendeloff 2008).
At the end of 2012, 34 states required or encouraged employers to implement injury and illness
prevention programs. Of these states, 15 require a
written program for certain industries, mostly as a
requirement for workers’ compensation insurance
coverage. Many of those states offer discounts on
workers’ compensation premiums of up to 5 percent
for qualifying organizations that adopt and implement
written safety and health programs. Some states
require most workplaces to have a written plan regardless of workers’ compensation coverage, whereas other
states only require them for high-hazard industries
such as industries doing a lot of electrical work or
handling hazardous chemicals. Other states only
require written plans for employers with workers’
compensation rates above a threshold that indicates a
high-hazard workplace: a standard that could be
emulated by OSHA given the incidence rates in Maine
boatyard. In the states that require formal safety plans,
the rules also direct the regulatory agency or workers’
compensation insurer to provide considerable assistance to employers to help them create and implement
the plan (OSHA 2012).
OSHA AND MAINE BOATYARDS

T

he cooperative regulatory model is not a new
concept to government, OSHA, or even Maine.
Implemented as a pilot initiative in the state of
Maine, OSHA’s Maine Top 200 program serves as
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an example of the cooperative partnership approach.
Begun in 1993, OSHA invited the 200 largest workplaces in Maine with the highest claims of lost time
due to injury to participate in a cooperative program
where they were given assistance in developing effective safety programs and low priority for inspection.
All but two of the firms chose to participate in the
Maine Top 200 program, and all showed great results
as employers eliminated hazards at a rate 14 times
greater than OSHA had in the previous eight years.
Sixty percent of employers experienced a reduction in
lost workdays (Lobel 2005). In addition, the resulting
partnership was reported to have identified and abated
upwards of 100,000 hazards without a fine being
imposed (Lobel 2006).
The Maine Top 200 program achieved results as
the focus of changed from measuring an inspector’s
effectiveness based on the number of violations found
during an inspection to solving genuine safety problems in the workplace (Watson 1998). OSHA inspectors participating in the program often declined to
issue citations when they believed the fines would not
be useful. In lieu of citations, OSHA chose to educate
the facilities and encouraged the sharing of information about how to deal with hazards. If one firm developed a new way to handle a problem, OSHA encouraged
it to share its knowledge with other firms that might
benefit (Mendeloff 1996). In addition to the changes
within OSHA, substantial progress was made at the
participating facilities. Management commitment to
safety increased, worker participation was significant,
and comprehensive safety and health plans were created
that included abatement plans for hazards that could
not be immediately corrected (Mendeloff 1996). The
biggest percentage drop in injuries occurred among the
27 firms with fewer than 200 employees. Small businesses were not specifically analyzed at the time, yet the
Top 200 program provides some insight as to how
OSHA can be effective at regulating small firms. As
OSHA ultimately ended plans to nationalize the Maine
Top 200 program due to legal challenges and changes
in governmental leadership, the state of Maine has
stepped in to work with firms with workforces under
250 employees through a program called Safety Works.
Although there is little published data available on
Safety Works’ success at reducing hazards, data obtained
from fiscal years 2008 to 2012 indicate that the
program’s six consultants visited over 500 firms per
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year and helped abate more than 3,000 hazards across
the state.
Maine’s Safety Works program is an outreach
program of the Maine Department of Labor designed to
reduce job-related injuries and illnesses through finding
and abating hazards. As a voluntary program; Safety
Works cannot issue citations or fines as OSHA can. The
agency’s services are available by request and are free for
firms wishing to use the agency to train their workers,
audit their operations to find compliance deficiencies, or
improve their safety management programs that are
required by OSHA. In addition, Safety Works has been
delegated authority by OSHA to determine whether
high-performing firms can gain entrance into an OSHA
program called Safety and Health Achievement
Recognition Program (SHARP), which provides a
two-year exemption status from OSHA inspections.
SHARP status also allows firms to fly physical flags
publicly indicating that they are safe companies to work
for, which may attract future employees and potential
customers. Given that enforcement is not part of its
mission statement, Safety Works helps firms to efficiently
and effectively manage their safety programs without
having to worry about fines for initial noncompliance.
Results for the program, taken from a 2010 Safety Works
comparative report based on OSHA’s Safety and Health
Program Assessment Worksheet (OSHA’s Form 33),
indicate that SHARP boatyards have higher safety and
health program assessment scores in every facet of their
safety program than do non-SHARP organizations.
Safety Works also represents an alternative regulatory
strategy that OSHA can use for guidance in its attempt
to decrease hazards found at Maine’s boatyards.
The Maine Marine Trades Association (MMTA) has
been advocating for such cooperative safety efforts since
1966 and has provided boatyards with information from
OSHA, annual forums with discussion on safety topics,
and presentations from safety professionals on how to
improve compliance programs. Perhaps limited by only
having one staff member, MMTA has never formally
worked with OSHA to educate its members about how
OSHA will interact with the boatyards, unlike in
Virginia where OSHA and the Virginia Ship Repair
Association (VSRA) have worked together for six years to
increase health and safety awareness and prevent injuries
and illnesses through hazard reduction. The data from
this collaboration indicate that the cooperative partnership between OSHA and VSRA has met these goals.
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SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

W

hile OSHA has had an impact on how Maine’s
boatyards manage safety efforts, the evidence is
clear that OSHA must change its regulatory strategy
to effectively eliminate hazards in this industry. Four
specific policy recommendations arise from this study
and include site-specific injury and illness prevention
programs, more frequent inspections of boatyards, a
more flexible regulatory strategy, and increased collaboration between OSHA and Maine boatyards. These
recommendations do not need to be implemented
sequentially to reduce hazards in boatyards.
Site-Specific Prevention Programs
OSHA should require boatyards to create sitespecific injury and illness prevention programs. Best
management practices indicate that a written organization-wide program would reduce hazards at the boatyards. OSHA should specifically develop materials to
help boatyards develop such programs. In addition,
OSHA inspectors should be available to meet with
participating boatyards each year to ensure that the
plans are living, actionable documents. Based on this
study, Maine’s boatyards would be a willing partner in
OSHA’s endeavors to comprehensively implement
injury and illness prevention programs. Participants
indicated a strong preference for more involvement by
OSHA as long as initial steps were nonpunitive and
undeniably beneficial to the boatyards.
A handful of boatyards have already implemented
such safety management programs, would be willing to
share their plans with other boatyards, and would also be
willing to discuss their efforts in person. One plan shared
after the focus groups were completed mirrored OSHA’s
suggested scope by including management leadership,
worker participation, hazard identification and assessment, hazard prevention and control, education and
training, and program evaluation and improvement with
procedures for investigating incidents and communicating results as basic elements of the plan. That particular
boatyard had no injuries for one year after implementation of its plan. Further, as a result of its efforts, the boatyard earned a special designation as a SHARP facility.
This designation was one of only three handed out to
boatyards in the state of Maine over the past decade
although more have since been awarded as a result of the
threat of the 2011 punitive local emphasis program.

MAINE POLICY REVIEW

•

Vol. 29, No. 1

•

2020



Three specific elements are important for ensuring
effective engagement at the boatyards:
• Commitment and engagement of management—Without a clear commitment by top
management, accompanied by involvement
from other site leadership, boatyards can lose
focus and not deliver on the plan. Management
engagement should be assured by requiring
management to sign off on the program annually
and send certification to OSHA.
• Safety committees and coaching—Workerbased safety committees are a valuable tool for
increasing employee engagement and serve as a
way for all staff to be coached on safety topics
and work together toward safety goals. These
must be made mandatory to hear from representative stakeholders at the site.
• Continuous improvement—Making a program
sustainable is much more difficult than initiating its development. Continuous improvement
forces employer involvement, as the plan is not
allowed to sit unused on a shelf. This requires
continual coaching of staff and continuous
review of the plan. Efforts at improvement and
resultant safety gains must be reported to OSHA
annually with management certification.
Although injury and illness prevention programs
have proven effective, some focus group participants
were skeptical about the enforcement possibilities triggered by a new management program. At a minimum,
OSHA inspectors might second-guess whether the
employers had satisfied the elements of a program as
spelled out by OSHA. At a maximum, OSHA might
issue two citations for one hazard: one for the hazard
and one for the safety and health program that failed to
flag it. There is also the possibility that OSHA’s requirement that employers under these programs find and fix
all hazards would mean that employers would be responsible for finding and fixing all toxic, thermal, or ergonomic hazards. These concerns are valid, and OSHA
should make it clear to all boatyards that the current
OSHA enforcement standard will apply to the boatyards
only when risks are not abated in a reasonable time
frame of perhaps 90 to 120 days.
In addition, OSHA must approach its regulatory
programs in different ways for different industries. The
participants noted that what is applicable to marinas, for

51

WORKER SAFETY IN MAINE’S BOATYARDS

example, may have little in common with the needs of
Maine’s construction boatyards. Instead of focusing on
the most common or serious risks across all industries,
OSHA should allow the boatyards to focus on mitigating the greatest risks specific to their industry and
workplace. OSHA should allow boatyard management
to determine the most effective and efficient path
forward for each company.

budgets and other resource constrictions. Simple,
low-cost approaches have been effective for other small
businesses, such as reproducible templates and forms
based on OSHA standards. Injury and illness prevention programs lend themselves to such low-cost
approaches because they are highly flexible; the core
elements can be implemented at a basic level suitable for
the smallest business.
More Frequent Inspections and Communication

OSHA’s current focus on
punitive compliance fails to
acknowledge the good-faith
efforts of most safety managers….
Focus groups also raised concerns about the varying
needs of different-sized companies when implementing
OSHA regulatory programs. Often larger, high-risksector companies are best prepared and have the most
sophisticated risk management systems already in place;
whereas smaller institutions frequently require the most
assistance. An injury and illness prevention program
must address the needs of both types of firms, so OSHA
must outline broad requirements so that small businesses such will clearly understand the requirements.
Most Maine boatyards do not have seasoned safety and
health professionals on staff. In addition, OSHA must
recognize the opportunity cost of time spent developing
a health and safety program. Costs associated with the
program, including time for employee training, increased
future orientation training, internal inspections,
committee meetings, and documentation, will not be
trivial to small boatyards. To this end, OSHA can adopt
a program based on the safety management programs
that are working at other Maine boatyards and solicit the
advice of Safety Works, which has worked with these
boatyards to help create the programs. Then OSHA’s
resources could focus on compliance assurance vs new
and costly inspections.
For many Maine boatyards, establishing injury and
illness prevention programs would be initially daunting.
Any program based on formal structures can be difficult
to establish in a small organization because of tight
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OSHA should inspect boatyards more frequently
and recommend boatyards work with Safety Works
through targeted communications that are not linked to
an inspection program. Focus group participants would
accept more frequent inspections if they were preceded
by nonpunitive audits by either OSHA or Maine’s Safety
Works program. The nonpunitive audits are important
as they would help sites feel more prepared for a formal
inspection. Regular triannual inspections would provide
a consistent regulatory atmosphere for the boatyards and
would promote greater management accountability to
hazard reduction within the boatyards s. While triannual
inspections should be the norm for Maine’s boatyards,
boatyards with injury rates consistently above the
industry average should expect more frequent inspections. High-injury work sites must be held accountable
for their lack of safety programming, and boatyards that
invest in hazard reduction should be rewarded with
fewer OSHA inspections. Boatyards in this high-injury
category should be required to work with Maine’s Safety
Works program to reduce the hazards at their sites.
Maine’s Safety Works program is important to this
recommendation. The program would provide a nonpunitive review of safety practices so boatyards may incrementally reduce hazards in an efficient and effective
fashion. In addition to building trust between the
parties, Safety Works’ increased presence would allow
the program to share best practices and enable boatyards
to further reduce hazards beyond mere compliance with
OSHA standards.
OSHA’s lack of staffing for targeted inspections will
make it challenging to fully implement this recommendation. OSHA’s nine Maine inspectors will be hard
pressed to inspect all Maine boatyards every three years.
OSHA’s budget proposals over the past few years have
put more emphasis on enforcement and compliance
assistance, so it is possible that more resources for such
an effort will be forthcoming. Everyone interviewed for
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this study indicated that their goal is a safer work site,
and this strategy will serve to further this goal.
More Flexible Regulatory Strategy
OSHA should look to adopt a regulatory strategy
that is less rule-book oriented and more flexible.
OSHA’s current focus on punitive compliance fails to
acknowledge the good-faith efforts of most safety
managers and their safety programs. Participants told
multiple stories of OSHA inspectors identifying a
safety infraction and imposing a financial penalty when
the issue could have been corrected on the spot had it
been identified by the manager or other workers in the
boatyard. When they impose fines that do not serve a
useful purpose, OSHA inspectors spend a great amount
of time documenting violations rather than working
with boatyards on solutions to the problems. Such solutions will most often include improving conditional
factors at the sites, such as poor housekeeping, but
OSHA should also share information on behavioral
changes necessary for reducing hazards, such as encouraging employees to wear proper protective equipment.
Focus group participants acknowledged that OSHA is
the expert, so such information sharing would increase
employee protection immediately. It would also
strengthen the boatyards’ safety management systems
by reducing information asymmetries between OSHA
and the boatyards.
OSHA’s Maine Top 200 program is an example of
a more flexible, less rule-book-based approach, and
Safety Works could serve as another flexible model for
OSHA. OSHA already looks to Safety Works to provide
collaborative services to small firms who voluntarily
agree to have Safety Works inspect their facilities.
Another avenue OSHA could explore is a partnership
with workers’ compensation firms to provide inspections as part of the boatyard’s injury and illness prevention planning efforts. Inspections and any changes
boatyards implement could serve as evidence that boatyards are taking their safety programs seriously. The
inspections could also provide an incentive for boatyards to work with their workers’ compensation carrier
more frequently.
Changing its regulatory strategy will be challenging
for OSHA as the agency has consistently employed a
punitive strategy focused on ensuring compliance with
its standards. During the period from 1993 to 1996 and
Maine’s Top 200 program, OSHA showed the potential
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for more flexibility in its enforcement program, but
recent local emphasis programs, as well as reports by
almost all participants in this case study, indicate OSHA
continues to focus on a punitive strategy.
Increased Collaboration
OSHA should create a more positive relationship
with boatyards through increased collaboration.
Interviewees and focus group participants believe that a
more formal agreement between Maine’s boatyards and
OSHA would improve relations between the two
groups. OSHA should enter into a written agreement
with the MMTA that formalizes the hazard-reduction
activities both parties will undertake over the next 10
years. Such a strategic partnership agreement would
build trust among the parties. It would also open lines
of communication for training and information sharing
to the individual boatyards and potentially result in a
decrease in the boatyards’ DART rate.
Currently, the boatyards and OSHA have a relatively confrontational relationship. To overcome this,
the parties must formally define their expectations of
one another. OSHA and MMTA directors should meet
to discuss their needs and come to a formal agreement
on activities that will take place over the 10-year period.
There should be a focus on the boatyards’ top-five injury
events, which currently include ergonomic injuries (over
twisting, repetitive use of tools, and overexertion in
lifting), stationary object strikes to the head and body,
and falls to the floor. Falls are a particular problem for
the boatyards as the shape of boat hulls leads to safety
hazards that traditional scaffolding and ladders cannot
solve. The partnership can then be introduced to the
individual boatyards and ultimately signed at MMTA’s
annual meeting.
As discussed earlier, there is precedence for such
cooperation: OSHA’s a partnership with the Virginia
Ship Repair Association. The Virginia program has
increased the number of ship repair employers with
comprehensive safety and health management systems
and has kept the DART rate below the most recent
national average for the industry. Given that Maine’s
boatyards generally do not have comprehensive safety
and health management systems and have a DART rate
that is higher than the national average, such goals
would be appropriate in Maine.
OSHA should work with the MMTA and Safety
Works to set up specialized trainings in the southern,
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central, and northern Maine to increase contact between
boatyards and the agency. Training topics could focus on
specific needs of the region’s boatyards and should
provide consistent and practical information. Following
the trainings, OSHA staff would continue to be available to answer questions and help with hurdles faced by
the boatyards.
Along with training sessions, OSHA should also
work with the MMTA and Safety Works to create a
communication structure that ensures boatyards receive
notices on compliance topics and educational opportunities. Electronic mailing lists or videoconferencing
would serve this purpose quite well. Focus group participants felt that receiving such notices, in any format,
would be beneficial and would open positive lines of
communication between OSHA and the boatyards.

O

SHA’s traditional enforcement program does little
to reduce hazards at inspected workplaces. Rather
than rely on its current practice of using compliance
officers to detect and abate hazards once every decade,
OSHA must enlist firms in a frequent and cooperative
effort to introduce or improve comprehensive safety and
health programs. To do so, compliance officers must be
able to exercise more discretion on when to inspect boatyards, on when to impose sanctions against employers,
and on when nonpunitive evaluation and guidance
would be the better way to reduce hazards.
A cooperative effort between OSHA and Maine
boatyards would build trust, increase the amount of
relevant information being provided to the boatyards,
and allow boatyards to receive follow-up to problems
they face. According to focus group participants, Maine
boatyards would welcome such nonpunitive efforts as a
way to improve worker safety. Ultimately, OSHA staff
would need a high level of managerial and leadership
skill to carry out a cooperative program, as staff would
carry out both the punitive and nonpunitive aspects of
the compliance program. But as efforts in other parts of
the country show, such a program could be highly
successful for both OSHA and Maine boatyards. NOTES
1. “Commonly Used Statistic,” US Department of Labor,
OSHA, accessed February 20, 2020, https://www.osha
.gov/oshstats/commonstats.html.
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